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Introduction
The People's Republic of China ("China") has been championed by com-
mentators as the next ideal market for applying a financing technique
called asset-backed securitization. 1 China's huge demand for capital is evi-
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1999; B.A., Columbia University, 1995. 1 would like to
thank William A. Wilson III, Professor Muna Ndulo, Yu Yan, and Mitchell M. Wong for
their inspiration and advice on the development of this Note. I dedicate this Note to my
father, Yuey Fang Kong, and my mother, Look Fu Kong, for their love and support. Ming
ji yang yu zhi en. A son could not ask for better parents.
1. See, e.g., George Yu, Securitization Gives One-Two Punch to China's Debt Mess,
AsIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY, Sept. 8, 1997, at A18; Colin Gailey, The Lure of Cash Flow,
AsIAMONEY, June 1997, at 47. Commentators have also championed asset-backed securi-
tization as an ideal method of capital financing for Asian countries in general. See, e.g.,
Asia The Place for Existing ABS, EMERGING MARKErS DEBT REP., Dec. 2, 1996, at 1; Asia -
Time to Consider Securitization, AsIAMONEY, Sept. 1997, at 26; Asia's Cash Crunch Creates
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dent. The country's ongoing expansion to modernize its highways,
bridges, and power plants has pressured it to continually seek new sources
of capital.2 Consequently, China needs alternate sources of capital, such
as asset-backed securitization, because Chinese banks are straddled with
huge non-performing loans provided to state industries.3
The recent liquidity crisis in Asia's economy highlights the impor-
tance of China's access to a stream of economic resources. In 1997, the
Thai baht plummeted in value, setting off a regional chain reaction that
depressed the valuation of the Malaysian ringgit, the Korean won, and the
Japanese yen.4 As a result, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange fell 35.4% from
its twelve-month peak as of October 1997.5
Asset securitization is a flexible financing technique that frees up illiq-
Hot Product, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 9, 1997, at 10; Troubles Could Prompt Rises in Asian
ABS, EUROWEEK, Sept. 5, 1997, at 15. But see Asia Cos, Banks Can't Offload Risk By
Securitizing: Moody's, DOWJONES INT'L NEws SERV., Nov. 25, 1997, at 04:24:00, available
in 1997 WL FarNews Database; Cecile Gutscher & Betty W. Liu, Asia Debt: Securitiza-
tion Cure Easier Said Than Done, DowJONES INT'L NEws SERv., Jan. 1, 1998, at 21:09:00,
available in 1998 WL FarNews Database. See generally Harinder Kohli et al., Making the
Next Big Leap: Systematic Reform for Private Infrastructure in East Asia, in CHOICES FOR
EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA 1 (Harinder Kohli et al. eds.,
1997). Asset-backed securitization is a financing technique that, among other functions,
liquifies current assets to raise new capital. See discussion infra Part I.B. This paper
uses the terms asset-backed securitization, asset securitization, and securitization
interchangeably.
2. See Kohli, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing China's future status as the dominant
user of international capital for infrastructure development and China's recent experi-
mentation with securitization as an additional source of raising capital).
3. See Colin Galloway, Are the PRC's State-owned Banks on the Verge of Collapse?,
CHINA L. & PRAc., Mar. 1997, at 56, 56 ("[Tlhese are all very sick banks in need of
complete recapitalization and overhaul. Because they have no liquidity, they are depen-
dent on deposits for their very existence... if everyone wanted their deposits back, the
whole system would collapse."); Kohli, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See Brian Brenner et al., Res*cuing Asia, Bus. WK., Nov. 17, 1997, at 116 (discuss-
ing the currency devaluations throughout Asian countries and the need for an infusion
of capital by the International Monetary Fund to bailout Asian countries). While
China's national currency, the yuan, also would have fallen in value following the Asian
liquidity crisis, the conditional convertibility of the yuan to foreign currencies sheltered
the yuan from devaluation. See Chinese Yuan Unaffected By Currency Turmoils, ASIA
PULSE, Dec. 16, 1997, at *1, available in 1997 WL 13576084.
5. See Guarantors Jockey For Position In Asia, MORTGAGE-BAcKED SEC. LETr ER, Jan. 5,
1998, available in 1998 WL 10104071 ("[Amid the 1997 Asian economic crisis,] for
many companies in Asia, securitization may be the only method of raising capital .... );
A Global Reality Check, Bus. WK., Nov. 10, 1997, at 40-41. Asia's 1997 economic crisis
sparked other economic crises throughout the world in 1998. 1998 marked Japan's
worst economic downturn since World War II, Russia's economic meltdown and the
devaluation of the ruble, Indonesia's depression that plunged 100 million people below
the poverty line, and Latin America's fear of capital flight. See David E. Sanger, As Econ-
omies Fail, the I.M.F. Is Rife With Recriminations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Al. The
United States faced economic problems as well. The Federal Reserve Bank intervened to
avert the collapse of Long Term Capital Management L.P., a hedge fund based in Green-
wich, Connecticut. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Chief Defends U.S. Role in Saving
Giant Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Al; see also Joseph Kahn, Merrill Cites
$1.4 Billion Exposure to Long-Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Cl.
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uid assets or receivables 6 while providing lower interest rates to borrowers,
greater liquidity to investors, lower funding costs to banks, and a lower cost
of capital to the economy. 7 The marvel of asset-backed securitization is
that it transforms illiquid assets into freely tradable liquid assets and
thereby provides another means of raising capital to supplement the tradi-
tional methods of issuing debt or equity. 8
Many Asian countries have successfully raised capital through asset-
backed securitization. 9 As a vote of confidence on the maturity of Asia's
asset-backed securitization market, Asian Securitization and Infrastructure
Assurance Ltd. (ASIA Ltd.) recently started business in Singapore as Asia's
first monoline financial guarantee company.10 Its purpose is to provide
country-specific expertise in the structuring of asset-backed securitization
transactions in Asia." In 1995, one commentator predicted that the Asian
asset-backed securitization market would reach $10 billion within three
6. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. LJ. Bus. &
FIN. 133, 135 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Asset Securitization]. Schwarcz succinctly
describes the "alchemy" of asset securitization:
In securitization, a company party "deconstructs" itself by separating certain
types of highly liquid assets from the risks generally associated with the com-
pany. The company can then use these assets to raise funds in the capital mar-
kets at a lower cost than if the company, with its associated risks, could have
raised the funds directly by issuing more debt or equity. The company retains
the savings generated by these lower costs, while investors in the securitized
assets benefit by holding these'investments with lower risk.
Id.
Assets refer to a fixed tangible commodity like a house or car. Receivables refer to the
rights to future payments such as mortgage payments on a house or lease payments on a
car. Sometimes the term "assets" is used expansively to include receivables as a subset
of assets. Id. In this Note, the distinction between assets and receivables is not an
important factor; both are used to designate a source base for securitization, although
receivables increasingly have been the dominant source base for asset securitization.
See also STEVEN L. ScmvARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ScHwARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE]
(discussing the nature of the source of payment and the importance of predictability of
payment for receivables).
7. See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of
Securitized Credit, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32 (1988) (analyzing the quantitative, eco-
nomic, and empirical benefits of asset securitization).
8. See Schwarcz, Asset Securitization, supra note 6, at 143. In addition to providing
a source of raising capital, asset securitization is useful in other respects, such as an
accounting management tool for off-balance sheet financing, a risk management tool,
and a tax planning tool. See id. This Note, however, will focus on China's primary
interest - the ability to liquify current assets to raise new capital for investment.
9. See STANDARD & PooR's, STRUCTURED FINANCE AsIA 1-2 (1997) (discussing the use
of securitization in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore).
10. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at 13-15 (explaining that the
role of financial guarantee companies such as Financial Security Assurance Inc. (FSA),
Capital Markets Assurance Corp. (CapMAC), and Financial Guaranty Insurance Co.
(FGIC) is to provide financial guarantees and credit supports). A financial guarantee
company serves as an independent third party credit enhancement agency that provides
guarantees to transactions backed by its own credit. In pricing the fee charged for its
guarantee service, the financial guarantee company provides the important function of
measuring the level of risk associated with a transaction. See id.
11. See Kevin Hamlin, Asia Ltd. to Reduce Cost of Raising Money, AsIA TIMEs, Dec. 21,
1995, at 14 ("By guaranteeing bonds issued by concerns involved in infrastructure
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years and $25 billion within five years.12 More recently, investors and fin-
anciers have championed asset-backed securitization as a financing tool to
ease, if not cure, the 1997 Asian economic liquidity crisis.
13
In April 1997, China pioneered its first asset-backed securitization. 14
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), a shipping company owned by
the Chinese government, completed an asset-backed securitization transac-
tion that securitized COSCO's future shipping revenues derived from U.S.
and European operations. 15 By December 1997, COSCO announced plans
for a second securitization for $500 million in future shipping revenues. 16
The successful completion of the COSCO transaction sparked interest in
raising more capital with domestic Chinese asset-backed securitization
transactions despite China's lack of a comprehensive legal system. 17
This Note examines whether the COSCO transaction was an anomaly
or whether the current Chinese legal system is mature enough to sustain an
asset-backed securitization market. 18 Part I introduces the history and
basic structure of the U.S. and Japanese models for asset securitization.
Part II examines the ability of the current Chinese legal system to support a
viable asset securitization transaction. Part III offers suggestions on the
development of Chinese asset securitization in the near future.
This Note argues that while the Chinese legal system cannot currently
accommodate an asset securitization styled after the U.S. common law
model, the Japanese civil code model offers instructive guidance. Instead
of directly adopting either the U.S. or Japanese models, China should use a
two-tiered model to satisfy the country's asset securitization needs.
I. Asset Securitization Legal Structures
A comparative review of different legal structures is helpful in analyzing
the prospects for asset securitization in China. First, China can learn from
the historical development of asset securitization in the United States and
the subsequent adoption of this financing technique in other nations. Sec-
projects, Asia [sic] Ltd. expects to provide Asian borrowers with improved access to big
institutional investors.").
12. See id. Unless otherwise noted, all currency figures in this Note are in U.S.
dollars.
13. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
14. See China's COSCO Returns, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT REP., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1.
15. See id. See also CapMAC Provides US$200 Million Guarantee for COSCO; People's
Republic of China's First Future Flow Transaction, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 4, 1997, at 10:3 1:00,
available in 1997 WL AUNewsPlusWires Database.
16. See China's COSCO Returns, supra note 14.
17. See discussion infra Part 11 (discussing the ability of the Chinese legal system to
support an asset-backed securitization).
18. The U.S. asset-backed securitization transaction is a natural model because the
United States hosts what is by far the largest asset-backed securitization market in the
world. See infra Part I.A. The exportation of the asset-backed securitization transaction
to other nations has proceeded by using the U.S. model as the basic reference structure.
See generally AssET-BAcKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE 3-7 (Theodor Baums & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1996) (discussing the development of U.S. securitization in compari-
son with European securitization programs).
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ond, a comparative analysis of asset securitization legal structures within a
common law and a civil law context is useful to determine what type of
legal framework is suitable for China.
A. History of Asset Securitization in the United States, Europe, and
Asia
Asset securitization originally developed in the common law legal environ-
ment of the United States.19 Mortgage-backed securities, the precursor to
modern asset-backed securities, was developed in the 1930s with the criti-
cal support of the U.S. government during the infancy of the U.S. residen-
tial mortgage industry.20 With active governmental support, a secondary
market in the trading of mortgage-backed securities slowly developed in
the 1950s and 1960s.21 In the 1970s, under the auspices of the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac), the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Government National Mort-
gage Association (Ginnie Mae), the United States witnessed explosive
growth in the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities.22 In the
19. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity of Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law
in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261,
1267-71 (1991); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolu-
tion, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. Rv. 1369, 1380-82 (1991).
20. See Schill, supra note 19, at 1263-65; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 19, at 1383-
84. Federal entities such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),
the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), provided crucial initial support in the early
growth of the U.S. asset-backed securitization market. See Schill, supra note 19, at 1263-
71; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 19, at 1383-85. Residential mortgages were the ideal
asset to securitize because U.S. mortgages have historical documented data on default
rates and repayment schedules. Thus, residential mortgages in the United States have
the quality of statistically predictable payment schedules that is the hallmark of an ideal
source for asset securitization. See Scw~ARcz, STRucTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at 3-4
(discussing the importance of predictability of payment in asset securitization and not-
ing that trade receivables, automobile loans, and credit card receivables have this
quality).
21. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 19, at 1384. After the U.S. real estate collapse
in the 1930s, government-related agencies actively supported the availability of funds for
housing finance. The Federal Housing Administration, created in 1934 by Congress,
provided government guarantees on certain mortgages; the Veteran's Administration in
1944 provided a mortgage insurance program to enhance the marketability of veteran's
mortgages; the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), created in 1938,
provided a secondary market for government guaranteed mortgages. A secondary mar-
ket in the trading of mortgage securities enhances the liquidity in the mortgage financ-
ing markets. See id.
22. See Schill, supra note 19, at 1268-70. Starting in the 1970s, U.S. federal agencies
bought qualifying home mortgages from lenders, pooled the mortgages, issued securi-
ties backed by the mortgage pool, resold these securities in capital markets, and pro-
vided guarantees for the timely servicing and payment of principal and interest. Ginnie
Mae guaranteed the timely payment of principal and interest in privately originated
mortgage-backed securities backed by pools of government guaranteed mortgages. Fan-
nie Mae provided a secondary market in mortgage-backed securities for the private sec-
tor. Freddie Mac broadened the authority of Fannie Mae to enable the purchasing of
conventional and variable-rate loans. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 19, at 1384.
The federal agencies not only provided guarantee assurance to foster liquidity in the
private sector, but also standardized legal documentation for the mortgage-backed secur-
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1980s, innovations in the mortgage-backed securities industry introduced
the "stripped" mortgage-backed securities, or the collateralized mortgage
obligation, which global markets widely received. This began the exporta-
tion of the U.S. asset securitization technique to other countries.23
In addition to the "stripped" mortgage-backed securities, other varia-
tions of the asset securitization technique including the use of other asset
types instead of the residential mortgage.24 Again, U.S. governmental
agencies provided the critical support in expanding the securitization tech-
nique to include other assets. For example, the Student Loan Marketing
Association securitized student loans, and the Farm Credit Banks securi-
tized farm loans.25 As testament to the versatility and aggressiveness of the
U.S. asset securitization market, in 1997, the "Bowie Bonds" successfully
securitized the future royalty income stream of rock star David Bowie's rec-
ord albums.26
The common quality for a successful asset type, whether it is a mort-
gage, student loan, or the future royalty payments of a rock star's record
albums, is predictability of payment in the asset.2 7 A typical asset-backed
securitization transaction requires the backing of an asset or a receivable
with a historically proven record of payments and default rates such that
investors are assured of consistent and timely payments.28 While the
United States succeeded in using residential mortgages as its bedrock
ities market. See id. at 1385. The U.S. mortgage-backed securities market remains the
most important and largest asset securitization market with capitalization valuation
totaling over $900 billion in 1990. See TAmAR FRANKEI., SECURirIZATION, STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL AssETs POOLS, AND AssET-BAcKED SEculunEs (1991).
23. See Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage Related
Securities, 64 NoTRE DumE L. REv. 497, 511-12 (1989). "Stripped" mortgage-backed
securities separate the interest-only payment from the principal-only payment. Sellers
would sell each "strip" separately to different types of investors. Fannie Mae is credited
as the first entity to offer stripped mortgage-backed securities. See id. See generally
Henry A. Fernandez, Symposium: Globalization of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 357 (1987) (discussing the importance of the collateralized mort-
gage obligation in launching asset securitization financing to the world).
24. See ScuwAucz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at 4 (listing more traditional
variations including commercial mortgage loans, trade receivables, automobile loans,
and credit card receivables as well as even more innovative variations used in private
offerings such as franchise fees, equipment leases, subrogation claims, junk bonds,
health care receivables, future media revenues, and utility surcharges).
25. See EdwardJ. Park, Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in Securitization: Potential
Benefits, Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories for Reform, 17 U. PA. J. INr'L EcoN. L. 723,
725 (1996).
26. See Rock Royalties Prove a Sound Investment, FIN. PosT, Feb. 12, 1998, at 42. The
"Bowie Bonds" securitized the future cash flow income stream of rock star, David Bowie,
for $55 million. Eager financiers and lawyers heralded exotic securitizations such as the
David Bowie transaction as a hallmark to the broad applications of asset-backed securi-
tization. See id. Japan's Nomura Securities Co. announced hopes to complete a $10
million asset securitization deal on the music publishing income of singer Rod Stewart.
See id.
27. See ScHwARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at 5.
28. See id. at 4-5; Rock Royalties Prove a Sound Investment, supra note 26, at 1 ("We're
looking at artists who've been around for long enough to prove their music has lasted,
and for us to predict how it's likely to sell in the future.").
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asset, other countries might not have the right combination of indigenous
legal, regulatory, and economic structures to provide an environment sup-
portive of residential mortgages. Therefore, other countries may have to
identify different assets to serve as underlying securities.29
Like the United States, the United Kingdom succeeded in nurturing a
viable asset securitization market backed by mortgages. Other European
countries, however, have not favored asset securitization transactions. 30
With the exception of the United Kingdom, which shares a common law
system similar to the United States, other European countries have failed to
successfully adopt asset securitization because their civil code legal sys-
tems burden the free development of asset securitization with inflexible
implementing legislation and regulatory control. The civil code system has
slowed Europe's assimilation of asset securitization.3 1
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and the Netherlands do not have a
legal structure capable of supporting asset securitization and also lack the
economic incentives to promote such legislation. 32 Germany and Italy
have passed implementing legislation, but asset securitization remains
29. See, e.g., ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, INVEST IN INDONESIA 2-9 (1997)
(explaining that Indonesia's burdensome residential mortgage registration requirements
make the mortgage unfeasible to securitize, thereby resulting in Indonesians favoring
credit card and auto-loan receivables). But see STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 9, at 3
(noting that Indonesia recently introduced the Mortgage on Land and Land-Related
Objects law to facilitate lending secured by land). The Chinese residential mortgage
market is similarly resistant to securitization because of registration burdens and a lack
of national uniformity in the regulation of residential mortgages. See infra Part 1I.B; see
also infra note 101 and accompanying text (listing some provincial mortgage .loans).
Instead, China has passed targeted laws and regulations to facilitate the securitization of
huge infrastructure assets such as highways and project finance. See infra Part II.C.
30. See generally AssE--BAcKEI SECURITIZATION IN EURoPE, supra note 18, at 4-6 (sur-
veying 14 European countries and concluding that only the United Kingdom, with its
common law system, has the legal structure and the economic incentives to foster a
viable market for asset-backed securities). In the United Kingdom, the asset-backed
securitization market developed in the mid-1980s. The United Kingdom focused pri-
marily on securitizing residential mortgages by unregulated mortgage lending compa-
nies that competed with the licensed deposit takers under the 1987 Banking Act or the
1986 Building Societies Act. While the U.K. asset-backed securitization market is the
most mature of the European nations, it still lags far behind the dynamic growth of the
United States. See id. at 99-100.
31. See id. at 5-6 (discussing the effects of a civil code system that requires imple-
menting legislation as opposed to the flexibility of the common law system.) Factors
other than the European civil code legal tradition are important to the slow spread of
asset securitization in Europe. A lack of uniformity in accounting rules, bank regulatory
restraints, less social acceptance for exotic financing techniques, and the inability to
attain a sustainable asset securitization market size for the smaller European countries
have collectively impaired the development of a significant asset securitization market in
Europe (except for the United Kingdom). But see Adam Reinebach, Securitizing Europe:
After years of hype about overseas potential, the asset-backed market is finally going global,
INV. DEALERS' DIG., Dec. 8, 1997, at 14. See generally AssEr-BACKED SEcumnzATION IN
EUROPE, supra note 18, at 5-6 (analyzing the prospects of any significant asset securitiza-
tion developments in 14 European countries).
32. See ASSET-BACKED SECURmTZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 18, at 9-23 (analyzing
Austria); id. at 51-53 (analyzing Denmark); id. at 55-69 (analyzing Finland); id. at 123-
32 (analyzing Greece); id. at 143-96 (analyzing the Netherlands).
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unattractive because of business and regulatory obstacles.33 France and
Spain have passed implementing legislation, but the small size of their eco-
nomic markets lack the depth in asset resources to make securitization an
economically attractive financing technique.34 Although France and Spain
have successfully completed and issued asset-backed securities transac-
tions, the volume of such activity is woefully small.3 5
The civil code system also poses similar problems for many Asian
countries.36 Unlike European countries, however, Asian countries have a
great need to generate new capital. Consequently, Asian governments have
spurred the development of implementing legislation for asset securitiza-
tion.37 In fact, several Asian countries have already adopted implementing
legislation.38 For example, Indonesia introduced the Mortgage on Land
and Land-Related Objects Law to facilitate secured lending based on land
assets. 39 Thailand introduced implementing legislation to create insol-
vency and trustee laws that parallel the U.S. legal structure. 40 Japan is suc-
cessfully developing a strong asset securitization market within its civil
code system by integrating implementing legislation with the guidance of a
competent regulatory agency.41 Despite differences between the American,
European, and Asian legal systems, it is likely that government officials and
private entrepreneurs will mold existing legal and regulatory structures to
facilitate asset securitization transactions if the economic need is great.
33. See id. at 87-98 (analyzing Germany); id. at 133-142 (analyzing Italy). In Ger-
many, no specific legal or regulatory framework exists to structure asset-backed securi-
tization transactions. However, investors can manipulate existing structures to support
an asset-backed securitization program in Germany. On the other hand, restrictive
banking regulations still make asset securitization in Germany unfeasible. See id. at 87-
98. But see Reinebach, supra note 31, at 14 ("In Germany... regulations were passed [in
1998] that allow German banks to securitize their assets.").
34. See ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 18, at 71-85 (analyzing
France); id. at 207-25 (analyzing Spain). In France, due to excessive legal restrictions
that were partly reduced by the French government, the volume of asset-backed securi-
tization transactions has been low. See id. at 71-85.
35. See id. at 5, 84-85, 207-11.
36. See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that Asian countries such as
Indonesia and Thailand with civil law jurisdictions need to first enact implementing
legislation).
37. For example, China has enacted implementing legislation to specifically target
asset securitization in infrastructure developments such as highways and project
finance. See infra Part II.C.
38. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 9, at 3 (identifying Indonesia and Thai-
land as examples of countries that have enacted implementing legislation specifically to
facilitate asset securitization).
39. See ORuucK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 29, at 7-8. Indonesia also
attracted the International Finance Corp.'s (IFC) attention to actively develop the Indo-
nesian asset securitization market. See Betty W. Liu, IFC Arranging Auto-Debt Bond in
Indonesia, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1997, at 13.
40. See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 9, at 3.
41. See Yoshiki Shimada & Shinji Itoh, Japanese Asset Securitization: A Guide for
Practitioners, 38 HARV. Irr'L LJ. 171, 173-75 & n.9 (1997); infra Part I.C.
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B. U.S. Legal Structure
The legal structure of U.S. asset securitization is the most advanced and
has had tremendous influence on the development of similar laws in
Europe and Asia.4 2 Thus, a review of the U.S. model offers lessons for the
future of asset securitization under Chinese law. The U.S. asset securitiza-
tion model is derived from a cross-disciplinary application of several areas
of jurisprudence, including security interest law, bankruptcy law, tax law,
regulatory requirements, and accounting rules.43 The following describes
a typical U.S. asset securitization structure, while acknowledging that there
is often flexibility in application, depending on the specific needs of pri-
vate parties.
The U.S. model transaction revolves around two primary parties: the
originator and the issuer.4 4 The originator begins the asset securitization
process by gathering a pool of similar assets.4 5 After gathering and pool-
ing the assets or receivables, the originator retains ownership of the receiv-
ables but transfers its beneficial interest in the receivables to the issuer.
The primary purpose of the issuer is functionally to sever the ties
between the legal interest and beneficial interest in the receivables. While
the originator retains legal ownership, the issuer, as a separate entity,
retains the beneficial interest and manages the securitization's pooling and
servicing operations. To ensure the separateness of the originator and the
issuer, the issuer is usually created as a bankruptcy remote special purpose
vehicle via a true sale46 of the assets. 47 The issuer receives the pool of
receivables, enhances the marketability of the receivables, and then sells
them to investors.4 s These final product securities are called asset-backed
42. See ASSET-BACKED SECURIT1zATION IN EUROPE, supra note 18, at 100 ("IT]he USA
has been the pace setter and all other countries have tried to follow the US example. The
US's market is by a long way the most matured market. .. ").
43. See ScHwARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at xiii-xv. This Note will focus
on the security interest and bankruptcy aspects necessary for any asset securitization
transaction. Tax and accounting law are important for business profitability and mar-
ketability reasons. However, this Note will not address tax, accounting, or regulatory
requirements.
44. See id. at 5-6.
45. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061, 1067-68 (1996) (describing the asset pooling process that usually seeks to
include receivables with similar terms, maturities, and salient characteristics); see also
Lyn Perlmuth, Pumping up the ABS, INsTTONAL INv., May 1995, at 36 (discussing the
increase of heterogeneous pooling that may later be segregated by issuing different
tranches of asset-backed securities).
46. See ScuwARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 6, at 28-29. A true sale severs
the legal and beneficial interests of an asset whereby the legal interest is retained by the
originator and the beneficial interest is transferred to the issuer. See id. The issuer and
originator must perfect the transfer of the receivables under registration laws to satisfy a
true sale. See id. at 28-34.
47. See id. at 16. The special purpose vehicle serves as the issuer and must maintain
its independence from the originator by achieving bankruptcy remoteness. See id. at 16-
28.
48. See id. at 13-15. A third party guarantee enhances the credit rating and thus the
marketability of the receivables so investors will have confidence in buying the securi-
tized notes backed by the receivables. After credit enhancement, the credit rating of the
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securities.
Investors in capital markets buy these asset-backed securities for cash,
and the proceeds of the sale are then transferred to the issuer.49 The issuer
usually converts this cash in a currency exchange swap and forwards the
swapped cash funds back to the originator.50 For the term of the asset-
backed security, the originator acts as the agent responsible for servicing
and collecting payments on the underlying receivables.5 1 Asset securitiza-
tion provides benefits to all the parties involved in the transaction - the
originator is provided with an additional source of capital, the issuer
receives a fee for transactional services, and investors have the opportunity
to participate in another type of security interest. 52
C. Japan's MITI Law
In 1993, Japan's National Diet enacted the MITI Law, named after its origi-
nal proponent, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 53
to implement legislation encouraging the use of the asset securitization
technique within the structure of the Japanese civil code system.5 4 Japan
derived the MITI Law from prior efforts to create an asset securitization
structure within the Japanese Civil Code.55 The MITI Law has become the
originator no longer has any effect on the credit rating of the receivables. Only a few
entities provide credit enhancement by financial guarantees including: Financial Secur-
ity Assurance Inc. (FSA), Capital Markets Assurance Corp. (CapMAC), Financial Guar-
anty Insurance Co. (FGIC), and ASIA Ltd. After credit enhancement, a credit rating
agency such as Standard & Poor's Corp. or Moody's Investor Service, Inc. would assign
a credit rating to the asset-backed securities. See id. at 14.
49. See id. at 33 (noting that one of the functions of the issuer is to administer the
collection of account receivables from the investors).
50. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 176 & n.12 (explaining the currency swap
mechanism and its importance primarily to international cross-border securitization
transactions).
51. See id. at 176; ScHIW~ARcz, STRUCTRD FiNANCE, supra note 6, at 47.
52. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 171-72.
53. See id. at 174 & n.9 ("MITI has regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction over
non-bank financing companies such as leasing and credit card companies.").
54. Tokutei Saiken to ni KakaruJigyo no Kisei ni Kansuru Horitsu [The Law Relating
to the Regulation of Business Concerning Specified Claims, Etc.], Law No. 77 of 1993
[hereinafter MITI Law].
55. Minpo, Law No. 89 of 1896 [hereinafterJapanese Civil Code]. Article 467 of the
Japanese Civil Code specifies procedures for perfecting the assignment of receivables for
securitization. Japanese Civil Code, supra, art. 467, translated in Shimada & Itoh, supra
note 41, at 179 n.22. Article 467 states the following:
Article 467. Assignments of Designated Claims (Shimei Saiken).
(1) The assignment of a designated claim shall not be effective against the
underlying debtor or any third party, unless the assignor has provided notice of
such assignment to the underlying debtor or the underlying debtor has con-
sented to such assignment.
(2) The notice or consent referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not be
effective against a third party other than the underlying debtor, unless such
notice or consent is set forth in a kakutei hizuke (certified date) certificate.
Id.
Securitization under Article 467 of the Japanese Civil Code requires a more cumber-
some receivables perfection process. Assignment of the receivables from the originator
to the issuer under Article 467 can be accomplished by either (1) notifying the assign-
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legal structure of choice in originating asset-backed securities in Japan and
has spurred an explosive growth of activity in Japanese asset-backed securi-
ties transactions. 56
The MITI Law initially targeted the expansion of asset securitization to
broad sectors of the Japanese economy. 57 However, after jurisdictional
skirmishes with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), MITI settled on a more
limited version of the original MITI Law.58
The current MITI Law applies only to certain originators with receiv-
ables falling within the MITI Law, such as credit card companies, leasing
companies, and other non-bank finance companies. 59 The MITI Law also
applies only to certain types of receivables called "Specified Claims."
60
ment to the underlying debtors with a kakutei hizuke (certified date) certificate, or (2)
presenting to the underlying debtor the kakutei hizuke to prove the date of assignment.
Both methods under Article 467 of the Japanese Civil Code are administratively more
cumbersome and costly compared to the MITI Law procedures for assignment to perfect
a security interest. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 179-80.
56. See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 9, at 9 (listing over Y100 billion of asset
securitization transactions rated by Standard & Poor's in 1996 and 1997). Despite the
preference for using the MITI Law, the Japanese Civil Code is still an available option
and is sometimes a required procedure for asset securitization in Japan. See Shimada &
Itoh, supra note 41, at 179-80.
57. See Non-Banks to Bank on Asset-Backed Securities, NiKM WKLY., Jan. 25, 1992
(discussing MITI's efforts to encourage non-bank finance companies to diversify their
funding sources through asset securitization).
58. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 174 n.9.
59. See MITI Law, supra note 54, art. 7.
60. Id. art. 2, para. 1, translated in Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 180 n.26.
Article 2. Definitions.
The term "Specified Claims" as used in this Law shall mean the following
claims:
Any claims to receive payment of money (the "Monetary Claims") in considera-
tion of the license for usage of machinery or any other goods under a certain
agreement pursuant to which the usage of such machinery or other goods is
licensed, having the term of such usage in excess of one (1) year (the "Term of
Usage") and without any provisions to the effect that one party or both parties
may elect the termination thereof at any time (i) on or after the commencement
date of the Term of Usage (the "Usage Commencement Date") or (ii) after the
lapse of a certain period from the Usage Commencement Date;
Any Monetary Claims accrued to the User referred to below under a certain
agreement pursuant to which the parties thereto have agreed that a voucher and
the like in exchange for which, or the presentment of which, goods may be
purchased from a specified vendor (the "Voucher and the Like") will be deliv-
ered to a person who wishes to purchase such goods by utilizing the same (the
"User") and, in cases where such User purchases goods from such specified
vendor in exchange for or by presenting the Voucher and the Like, the amount
equal to the purchase price thereof will be paid to such vendor and such amount
will be recovered from such User over a two (2)-month or greater period in three
(3) or more installments;
Any Monetary Claims accrued to the purchaser referred to below under a cer-
tain agreement pursuant to which the parties thereto have agreed that, on the
condition that, without utilizing the Voucher and the Like, a specified vender
has sold goods to a purchaser, the amount equal to the whole or a portion of the
purchase price thereof will be paid to such vendor, and such amount will be
recovered from such purchaser over a two (2)-month or greater period in three
(3) or more installments;
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The scope of "Specified Claims"6 1 includes lease receivables, 6 2 credit card
receivables, 63 and installment loans.64
The MITI Law requires that the issuer be a recognized "Specified
Claim Purchaser" before receiving the assignment of receivables from the
originator and the subsequent selling of the asset-backed securities in the
markets. 6 5 To achieve the status of a "Specified Claim Purchaser," licenses
must be obtained from both MITI and MOF.6 6
To add another level of regulatory oversight, the MITI Law augments
the standard U.S. model of asset securitization with the "Basic Claim."'6 7
The "Basic Claim" is a cross-receivable that the issuer gives to the originator
to represent the issuer's obligation to pay the purchase price of the receiva-
ble or "Specified Claim. '68 The "Basic Claim" is then divided into "Individ-
ual Claims"69 that are then sold to investors through an "Individual Claims
Dealer."70
By creating these entities, the MITI Law reserves regulatory oversight
over the entire asset securitization transaction. 7 1 Both the "Specified
Claims Purchaser" and the "Individual Claims Dealer" must jointly file the
Any Monetary Claims accrued to the User referred to below under a certain
agreement pursuant to which the parties thereto have agreed that the Voucher
and the Like will be delivered to the User and, in cases where such User
purchases goods from a specified vendor in exchange for, or by presenting, the
Voucher and the Like, the amount equal to the purchase price thereof will be
paid to such vendor and such amount will be recovered from such User for each
such period of time as is agreed to in advance for such installment of amount
and as calculated in the manner agreed to in advance based upon the aggregate
of such purchase price; or
Any Monetary Claims generated pursuant to such agreement as is set forth in a
Cabinet Order or agreement similar to the agreement referred to in each of the
preceding five subparagraphs.
Id.
61. See Tokutei Saiken to ni KakaruJigyo no Kisei ni Kansuru Horitsu Seko-rei [The
Enforcement Order Promulgated Under the Law Relating to the Regulations and Busi-
ness Concerning Specified Claims, Etc.] art. 1 [hereinafter MITI Law Enforcement
Order]. Under Article 1 of the MITI Law Enforcement Order, the term "Specified
Claims" also includes credit card receivables involving the purchase of services and
credit card receivables or loan receivables where the vendor of goods or provider of serv-
ices extends credit to finance the purchase by its customers of goods or services. See id.
art. 1.
62. See id. art. 2, para. 1, subpara. 1 (lease receivables).
63. See id. art. 2, para. 1, subpara. 2 (credit card receivables of a fixed installment
type); id. art. 2, para. 1, subparas. 2-4 (credit card receivables of a revolving repayment
type and other receivables stipulated by the Cabinet Order).
64. See id. art. 2, para. 1, subpara. 3 (installment loans extended for the purpose of
financing purchases of merchandise).
65. MITI Law, supra note 54, art. 2, para. 5 & art. 30; MITI Law Enforcement Order,
supra note 61, art. 13.
66. MITI Law, supra note 54, art. 2, para. 5 & art. 30.
67. Id. art. 2, para. 4, subpara. 1.
68. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
69. Id. art. 2, para. 6.
70. Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 181 & n.30.
71. See id. at 182-83.
Vol. 32
1998 Prospects for Asset Securitization in China
assignment of the "Specified Claim" and "Basic Claim" with MITI. 72 MITI
must then review the asset securitization transaction within sixty days and
may order modification of the transaction.73 Finally, both MITI and MOF
must grant licenses to either the "Specified Claims Purchaser" or the "Indi-
vidual Claims Dealer."74
The MITI Law has proven to be a success. 75 There are limitations and
regulatory controls inherent in the MITI Law asset securitization process.
However, the high volume of transactions completed under the MITI Law is
a testament to the possibility of creating an efficient legal structure under a
civil code system while retaining strong regulatory oversight. 76 Even dur-
ing the 1997 Asian economic crisis, Japanese investors completed several
asset securitizations "including deals backed by catastrophe bonds, equip-
ment leases, apartment loans, and auto loans."7 7
II. Applicable Chinese Laws
China already has a patchwork system of laws relevant to asset securitiza-
tion. While legal modernization is an ongoing process, the past three years
have marked the introduction of several landmark laws and regulations
applicable to Chinese asset securitization, followed by additional clarifica-
tion and application of these laws and regulations.
A. Chinese Legal Environment
Chinese law differs fundamentally from Western law in many respects.
For example, China lacks an independent judiciary. Moreover, judicial
decisions merely serve as guidance and have no binding precedential value
either to other Chinese courts or to the issuing court itself.78 The judiciary
is merely a functional arm of the Chinese political bureaucracy that faith-
72. MITI Law, supra note 54, art. 6.
73. See MITI Law Enforcement Order, supra note 61, art. 4, paras. 1 & 2.
74. See MITI Law, supra note 54, arts. 30, 52.
75. MITI has disclosed that transactions valued at over one trillion yen have already
been completed under the MITI Laws. See Sasho Tomoko, Shisan no Shokenka/
Ryudoka ni Okeru Shisan no Genboyusha ni yoru Shisan Naiyo ni Kansuru Joho Teikyo
Koi to Himitsu Hoji Gimu [Information Disclosure and Confidentiality Obligations Con-
cerning the Assets Owned by the Originators of such Assets in the Case of Securitiza-
tion], 2 SHIsA RYuDoKA K'Noyu, Aug. 1996, at 86, 102 n.4. Japanese securitization
issuances totaled $1.95 billion in 1997 and commentators predict thatJapanese securi-
tization issuances will exceed $20 billion in 1998. See Matthew Davies, Better Times
Ahead in Asia, Prmv. PLACEMENT REP., Jan. 26, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 5034620.
76. See Davies, supra note 75, at I ("Japanese regulators had finally realized the ben-
efits of securitization and were working to make issuance easier."); see also Reinebach,
supra note 31, at 17 (reporting that Japanese "legislation is becoming more pro-
securitization").
77. Reinebach, supra note 31, at 17. "[Japan's] plan is to eventually securitize mort-
gages originated by the Housing Loan Corp., Japan's government mortgage lender." Id.
78. See Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A Primer for
Investors, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Iwr'L & COMp. L. 345, 350 (1997); Jonas Alsen, An Introduc-
tion to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 18-19 (1996).
The legal system is still weak in China and there exists no true rule of law. As
long as the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) holds absolute power, the courts
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fully executes the laws.79 China has no internal restraints similar to the
American principles of "checks and balances" or "separation of powers."80
Chinese law is, therefore, an inherently politicized system more cor-
rectly characterized as an amalgamation of administrative decrees reflect-
ing official commands. 8 ' Since legal decisions have no precedential value,
one cannot rely on a court's interpretation of Chinese law as an authorita-
tive decision.8 2 Even published laws and regulations may not reassure
investors because those rules are subject to repeal without warning or
notice.8 3 Additionally, the Chinese legal system lacks transparency. For-
will never be strong, independent organs. Regional protectionism makes it diffi-
cult to enforce a claim from another part of the country.
Id. at 60 (parenthesis added); see Stanley B. Lubman, Emerging Functions of Formal Legal
Institutions in China's Modernization, 2 CHINA L. REP. 195, 245-49 (1983); see also Stan-
ley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55
CAL. L. REv. 1284, 1325-28 (1967) (describing politicization of judicial mediation).
79. See Alsen, supra note 78, at 18 ("Within a genuine socialist legal system, it is
evident that the judiciary cannot be granted independence in the same way as the West.
The state embodies the will of the proletariat, and the courts are subordinate to the
highest organs of state power."); Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching
U.S. Practices?, 21 YALEJ. INT'L. L. 183, 194-95 (1996) (citing WILLIAM C. JONES ET AL.,
LAW OF THE PRC III (Dec. 28, 1993)); Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 351 ("[Dlespite
constitutional and legislative language that confers the power to decide cases indepen-
dently, the courts, like all other governmental institutions, are subject to tight political
control...."). Chinese legal policies are formulated by Communist Party members who
intertwine their political role with positions of high authority in the Chinese judiciary.
Id. ("Party policy in legal affairs is usually formulated and coordinated by the Political-
Legal Committee of the Party Central Committee, whose leading members include the
President of the Supreme Court, the Procurator General, the Minister of Justice, the Min-
ister of Public Security and the Minister of State Security.").
80. Benson, supra note 79, at 194; Alsen, supra note 78, at 18-19.
Although there is no separation of powers, a certain degree of specialization
does exist. According to article 126 of [China's] Constitution, the courts exer-
cise judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by any
administrative organ, public organization or individual. Theoretically, the
courts are therefore independent from all other organs excluding the NPC
(National People's Congress). In reality, the courts are weak institutions under
heavy influence from party and regional interests.
Id. at 18 (parenthesis added).
81. See Benson, supra note 79, at 191.
82. While Chinese courts are urged to follow guidance from prior court opinions,
the lack of binding precedential power detracts from the reliability of past court opin-
ions. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. See Y.M. Elaine Lo, New Procedures Expand International Borrowings by Domestic
Organizations, CHINA L. & PRAc.,Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 66 [hereinafter Lo, International Bor-
rowings]. A recent example of the willingness of Chinese officials to repeal prior laws
and regulations is the September 24, 1997 promulgation of the Administration of Bor-
rowing of International Commercial Loans by Domestic Organizations Procedures
("1998 International Loans Procedures"). The 1998 International Loans Procedures
repealed: (1) the 1991 Administration of Borrowing of International Commercial Loans
by Domestic Organizations Procedures; (2) the July 14, 1995 Conceiving Project
Finance Conducted by PRC Enterprises Circular issued by the People's Bank of China;
(3) the April 17, 1996 Raising of Finance Overseas by Overseas Branches of the PRC
Domestic Banks which Conduct Foreign Exchange Business Provisions promulgated by
SAFE; and (4) theJanuary 16, 1997 Further Strengthening the Monitoring of the Raising
of Finance by Overseas Branches of PRC Domestic Enterprises issued by the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). See id.
1998 Prospects for Asset Securitization in China
eigners and even Chinese citizens cannot easily access many internal
regulations. 8 4
Instead, official statements from the government are more indicative
of Chinese law. For example, a defendant can use official policy state-
ments to predict with greater accuracy the Chinese government's position
in an enforcement action where the defendant is charged with breaching
the law.8 5 Thus, analyzing Chinese "law" essentially becomes an exercise
in analyzing Chinese politics. 86
Laws and regulations promulgated by the central government (the
National People's Congress) override local provincial laws.8 7 While the
central government has the power to issue overriding legislation, often
such legislation is in the form of general principles and guidelines that
permit broad interpretation.8 8 Local implementing regulations by special-
ized government agencies and local government officials provide the
details of the actual law.8 9 Finally, political struggles between the prov-
inces and the national government can often create inconsistencies in the
implementation of laws. 90 Thus, the viability of an asset securitization
within the context of Chinese law hinges upon both national laws and the
interpretive rules and regulations of the relevant authorities.
B. General Laws and Regulations
China currently lacks a comprehensive national legal system for the suc-
cessful transplantation of the U.S. model of asset securitization. Instead, a
patchwork of related Chinese laws and regulations on the creation of a
security interest provides only an ad hoc framework for supporting domes-
Another example is the September 25, 1996 promulgation of the Administration of
the Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions Inside China Pro-
cedures by the People's Bank of China, which repealed the 1991 Administration of
Domestic Organizations Providing Foreign Exchange Guarantees to Foreign Entity Pro-
cedures. See Y.M. Elaine Lo, Security Provision Rules Give Government Tighter Control
Over Lending Issue, CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 34 [hereinafter Lo, Secur-
ity Rules].
84. See Benson, supra note 79, at 192.
85. See id. at 192-93. This is why connections, or guanxi, are so important to garner
support from relevant bureaucratic officials. See id. For a concise discussion on guanxi
and network building, see MIN CHEN, ASIAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMs: CHINESE, JAPANESE
AND KoREAN STYLES OF BusINEss 52-65 (1995).
86. See Peter Howard Come, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Invest-
ment Regulation in China, 27 CASE W. REs. INT'L L. 247, 247-48 (1995) (discussing the
vagueness of Chinese laws, the vast discretionary power of administrative authorities to
interpret and reinterpret law, and the constant change of law in China).
87. See Benson, supra note 79, at 195-97. Although the National People's Congress
is formally the highest central government body, the de facto enactors of legislation
within the National People's Congress are the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress and the members of the Chinese Communist Party that control the Stand-
ing Committee. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 193.
90. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 349 ("Often investors are caught in the
middle, between the more investor-friendly local authorities and the more macro-ori-
ented central authorities, each offering their own - often sharply divergent -visions of the
applicable regulatory framework and the proper way to proceed.").
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tic Chinese based asset securitization transactions. 9 1
1. Laws on Creating a Security Interest
Asset-backed securitization must have a legal structure capable of creating
a security interest.92 Originally, China attempted to adapt its Civil Law to
the needs of creating a security interest.9 3 The Civil Law serves as China's
national gap-filling code and permits freedom of contract within its stipu-
lated limitations.94 Article 89 of the Civil Law explicitly recognizes secur-
ity interests and permits a debtor or a third party on the debtor's behalf to
pledge certain types of assets as guarantees. 95 In addition to recognizing
security interests, section 2 of the Civil Law also offers rudimentary recog-
nition of creditor's rights and the legal concept of priority in the case of
insolvency.9 6 Although recognizing security interests and priority rights,
the Civil Law remained silent regarding the application of a security inter-
est holder's priority rights in a dispute involving multiple security interest
91. See supra Parts II.B.1-2, II.C. In this Note, a domestic transaction refers to a
transaction within China's legal jurisdiction as opposed to an offshore issuance of asset-
backed securities under the jurisdiction of the laws of another country.
92. See supra Part I.B (discussing the U.S. legal structure).
93. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Provisions of Civil
Law of the People's Republic of China] (Jan. 1, 1987), translated in William C. Jones, A
Translation of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 13 REv.
SocIALisT L. 357, 376-78 (1987) [hereinafter Civil Law].
94. See Jerome A. Cohen, China Adopts Civil Law Principles, CHINA Bus. REv. 48
(Sept.-Oct. 1986) (discussing the overarching role of the Civil Law as a national gap
filler when local rules and regulations do not provide clarity); see also Christopher G.
Oechsli, The Developing Law of Mortgages and Secured Transactions in the People's Repub-
lic of China, 5 CHINA L. REP. 1, 3 (1988) ("The Civil Law implicitly endorses freedom of
contract within boundaries allowed by statute.").
95. Civil Law, supra note 93, art. 89. The following are some relevant clauses from
the Civil Code relating to the creation of a security interest:
2) The obligor or a third party may tender designated property as collateral. If
the obligor does not perform the obligation, the obligee has a priority right to
obtain compensation according to the provisions of the law from the value of the
collateral converted into money or out of the proceeds received from selling off
the collateral;
3) One party may give the other party a deposit within the scope provided by
law. After the obligor performs, the deposit will either be deducted from the
price or returned. When the party that has given the deposit does not perform
the obligation, he has no right to demand the return of the deposit. When one
receiving the deposit does not perform, he must return double the deposit;
4) When, according to contract, one party occupies the other's property and the
other party does not pay the agreed upon sum within the time agreed upon, the
party in possession has a lien on the said property, and, according to the provi-
sions of law, has a priority right to be compensated out of the value of the liened
property converted into money or out of the amount received when the liened
property is sold off.
Id. The Civil Law, however, explicitly excludes land and mortgages from being a secur-
ity interest. See id. art. 89(ii).
96. See Oechsli, supra note,94, at 3 ("Creditors shall have the 'right to receive priority
payment by, according to the provisions of the law, converting the security to its value or
by selling the secured assets.'").
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holders.97
In an effort to clarify the concept and application of security interests
in China, the Supreme People's Court issued several opinions regarding the
Civil Law.98 These opinions offered cursory elaboration on some details
regarding the interpretation of the Civil Law and the relationship of a
security interest with priority rights and insolvency laws.99 However, due
to the vagueness of the Civil Law and the lack of binding precedents, the
Civil Law and the Supreme People's Court opinions interpreting it pro-
vided insufficient reliability for investors of security interests.100 Thus,
even before the enactment of a specific national law on security interests,
provinces and localities such as Beijing, Guangdong, Guangzhou, Fujian,
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin independently took initiatives to issue
local regulations and insolvency procedures to clarify the law on the appli-
cation and use of security interests. 10 1
In 1995, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
97. See Benson, supra note 79, at 219-20 (commenting that Chinese courts lack the
sophistication to recognize or understand the concept of priority rights); see also Oech-
sli, supra note 94, at 3-4 (detailing the function of priority to third party creditor claims).
98. See, e.g., Opinion ofJuly 14, 1992 (Civil Procedure Law), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Gongbao [Supreme People's Court], reprinted and translated in GRAHAM MORRISON, TAK-
ING SECURITY: AN INTRODUCTION IN AsIA LAW AND PRACTICE, TAKING AND ENFORCING
SECURITY IN CHINA 89, 89, art. 241 (Graham Morrison et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA]; Opinion of Nov. 7, 1991 (Enterprise Insol-
vency Law (Trial Implementation)), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Supreme People's
Court], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra, at
110, 111, art. 4(3); Opinion of Aug. 13, 1991 (Handling of Loan Cases by People's
Courts), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao [Supreme People's Court], reprinted and trans-
lated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra, at 123, 126, art. 18; Opinion of
Jan. 26, 1988 (Civil Law General Principles), Zuigao Remnin Fayuan Gongbao [Supreme
People's Court], reprinted and translated in TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA,
supra, at 84, 86, art. 115.
99. See TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 98, at 84-91, 110-26.
100. See supra notes 78, 82 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Beijing Shi Fangdichan Diya Guanli Banfa [Beijing Municipality Meas-
ures for the Administration of Real Estate Mortgages] (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Bei-
jing Mortgage Loans]; Beijing Shi Waishang Touzi Qiye Qingsuan Chengxu [Liquidation
of Foreign Investment Enterprises Procedures, Beijing Municipality] (June 1, 1992)
[hereinafter Beijing Foreign Investment Liquidation]; Dongguan Shi Diya Daikuan Tong-
gao [Secured Loans Circular, Dongguan Municipality] (Aug. 28, 1992) [hereinafter
Dongguan Secured Loans]; Fujiansheng Diya Daikuan Tiaoli [Secured Loan Regulations,
Fujian Province] (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Fujian Secured Loans]; Guangdong Sheng
Diya Daikuan Guanli Tiaoli [Administration of Secured Loan Regulations, Guangdong
Province] (Dec. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Guangdong Secured Loans]; Guangzhou Shi
Fangdichan Diya Guanli Banfa [Administration of Real Property Mortgage Procedures,
Guangzhou Municipality] (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Guangzhou Mortgage Loans];
Shanghai Shi Waishang Touzi Qiye Qingsuan Tiaoli [Shanghai Municipality Regulations
for the Liquidation of Foreign Investment Enterprises] (Oct. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Shang-
hai Foreign Investment Liquidation]; Shanghai Renminbi Daikuan Zanxing Guanli Banfa
[Provisional Regulations of Renminbi Loan Administration, Shanghai Municipality]
(June 9, 1988) [hereinafter Shanghai Renminbi Loans]; Tianjin Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu
Fangdichan Diya Daikuan Guangli Banfa [Administration for Real Property Mortgage
Loan Procedures, Tianjin Economic and Technical Development Zone] (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Tianjin Mortgage Loans]; TAKING AND ENFORCING SECURITY IN CHINA, supra note 98, at
3, 11, 32, 35, 44, 55, 127, 137.
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passed the national Security Law.102 The Security Law preempted all pre-
vious contrary local laws and consolidated the treatment of security inter-
ests in China. The passage of the Security Law provided a major step in
the uniformity of security interest law in China. Also, the endorsement of
the Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress significantly elevated the political importance of security interest
law.1 0 3
Under the Security Law, China only recognizes five types of security
interests: guarantee, mortgage, pledge, lien, and deposit.104 Each of these
security interests serve different purposes. In a guarantee, a third party
undertakes the full liability of the obligor if the obligor fails to perform its
obligation. 10 5 A mortgage is used as a security interest for certain types of
land transfer.10 6 A pledge creates a security interest for an obligee by phys-
ical possession of movable property from the obligor to the obligee. 10 7 A
lien creates a security interest over the obligator's collateral property if an
obligation is not paid within a stipulated time period. 08 A deposit is a
twenty percent maximum transfer of cash to secure performance of an obli-
gation.10 9 Of these five types of security interests, the most commonly
used is the guarantee. 1"0 While the passage of the Security Law was itself
a great achievement in 1995, refinements soon helped make Chinese secur-
ity interests more attractive to the foreign investor.
2. Laws on Creating a Foreign-Related Security
For foreign investor participation, Chinese law limits investment by use of
regulations for "foreign-related security.""' On September 25, 1996, the
People's Bank of China promulgated the Foreign Security Procedures,112
102. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Danbao Fa [Security Law of the People's
Republic of China], 8th Nat'l People's Cong., 14th Sess., Standing Comm. (Oct. 1, 1995)(promulgated by Pres. Order No. 50 (June 30, 1995)) [hereinafter Security Law],
reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRac., Aug. 1995, at 21.
103. See Benson, supra note 79, at 197 ("The recent issuance of a national security
law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress elevated the status of
security in China considerably.").
104. See Security Law, supra note 102, arts. 2-10; Conrad Chan, Security Changes,
AsIA L., June 1996, at 26. Upon challenge, the validity of a pledge as a security interest
was recently upheld by the Tianjin Municipal Higher People's Court. See Chinese Court
Aligns Itself to International Standards, CHINA L. & PRAc., July-Aug. 1997, at 40.
105. See Security Law, supra note 102, arts. 17-20.
106. See id. arts. 33-37.
107. See id. arts. 63, 81.
108. See id. arts. 82-87.
109. See id. arts. 89-91.
110. See Chan, supra note 104, at 26 ("[Gluarantees are by far the most common
method of security.").
111. JingneiJigou Duiwai Danbao Guanli Banfa [Administration of the Provision of
Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions Inside China Procedures], art. 2
(promulgated Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Foreign Security Procedures], reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 43.
112. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waihui Guanli Tiaoli [The PRC Foreign
Exchange Control Regulations] (effective Apr. 1, 1996), reprinted and translated in CHINA
L. & PRAc., Mar. 1996, at 37.
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which added more guidelines to the Security Law for foreign investors seek-
ing to purchase security interests sold by domestic Chinese entities. 113 On
January 12, 1998, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 114
issued the Foreign Security Implementing Rules, further clarifying the For-
eign Security Procedures. 115
Under the Foreign Security Procedures, only three forms of security
interests are recognized by the Security Law as foreign-related security:
guarantees, mortgages, and liens. 116 In addition, the range of assets and
receivables available for a foreign-related security interest is limited to
financings, financial leases, compensation trade, overseas contracted
projects, or any other form of security with foreign indebtedness. 117
Article 4 of the Foreign Security Procedures addresses who may serve
as the issuer, or the "Security Provider," and limits the Security Provider to
the vague designations of "financial institutions" and "enterprise legal per-
sons."118 The requirements for a Security Provider is complicated by
requirements under Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Foreign Security Procedures.
First, Article 4 denies Security Provider status to any State organization or
public institution except with the approval of the State Council. 1 9 Second,
Article 6 denies Security Pr'ovider status unless an assets-ratio test is satis-
fied to ensure that the Security Provider is financially healthy to serve as
an issuer of foreign-related security.120 Finally, Article 7 denies the Secur-
113. See Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, art. 1; Lo, Security Rules, supra
note 83, at 34; Wang Wai Li & Robert Caldwell, Provision of Security Procedures Create
Paradox in Financing, CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 40.
114. SAFE was formerly known as the State Administration for Exchange Control,
"SEAC."
115. SeeJingneiJigou Duiwai Danbao Guanli Banfa Shishi Xize [Administration of the
Provision of Security to Foreign Entities by Domestic Institutions Inside China Proce-
dures Implementing Rules] (Jan. 12, 1998) (effective retroactively onJan. 1, 1998) [here-
inafter Foreign Security Implementing Rules], reprinted and tranlated in CHINA L. &
PRAc., Apr. 1998, at 22; Ian Tokley & Wylie OMYang, New Rules on PRC Security Providers
Raise Comfort Level for Foreign Lenders, CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 1998, at 19.
116. See Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, art. 2. Article 2 of the Foreign
Security Procedures limits the scope of recognized "security to foreign entities" to:
1) letters of guarantee, standby letters of credit, promissory notes, drafts and
any other form of guarantees in favour of a foreign party;
2) mortgages over property specified by Article 34 of the PRC, Security Law;
3) pledges over moveable property or rights as specified in Section I of Chapter
Four and Article 75 of Section 2 of Chapter Four of the PRC, Security Law
respectively.
Id.; see Li & Caldwell, supra note 113, at 40; Rongwei Cai & Zheng Zhenwu, China
Tightens Rules on Foreign-Related Security, AsiA L., Nov. 1996, at 36.
117. Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, art. 2; see also Li & Caldwell, supra
note 113, at 40.
118. Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, art. 4. Article 4 of the Foreign
Security Procedures specifies that the Procedures govern the following Security Provid-
ers: (1) Financial institutions authorized to operate the business of providing security to
foreign entities (other than foreign financial institutions), and (2) Non-financial enter-
prise legal persons, including domestic enterprises or foreign investment enterprises,
with the ability to repay debts and discharge liabilities on behalf of other persons. See
id.
119. See id. art. 4.
120. See id. art. 6. Article 6 of the Foreign Security Procedures provides:
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ity Provider the power to issue foreign-related security on behalf of an orig-
inator that is operating at a loss.12 1 Thus, due to the qualifications of
Articles 4, 6, and 7 and the vague definition of the Security Provider as a
"financial institution" or "enterprise legal person," legal commentators
regard the application of the law to specific issues as confusing.122
One rule that is certain, however, is that SAFE, the specialized regula-
tory agency that issued the Foreign Security Procedures, must approve the
foreign-related security. 123 Any foreign-related security that fails to satisfy
the requisite SAFE approval is void. 124 In addition, Article 3 of the Foreign
Security Implementing Rule expressly reiterates the requirement of SAFE
approval to provide security interests to foreign parties. 125
The Foreign Entities Provision even extends the scope of SAFE
approval beyond the limited security types. Security Providers cover all
Chinese legal entities that seek to extend guarantees, pledges, security, and
"also mortgages and pledges" in favor of foreign creditors and foreign bene-
ficiaries. 126 Thus, since uncertainties regarding the letter of the law
remain, SAFE approval is the only assurance an investor can obtain that the
foreign-related security is in compliance with the law.127
The January 1998 Foreign Security Implementing Rules reconfirm
SAFE's prominent regulatory role. 128 These rules generally require SAFE
approval for the provision of foreign-related security.129 Parts 2, 3, and 4
of the Foreign Security Implementing Rules provide the approval and regis-
tration procedures for guarantees, mortgages, and pledges, respectively. 130
Assignments of security rights require prior consent of the Security Pro-
vider and SAFE approval. 131 Even if SAFE approval is not required, SAFE
registration is required in all circumstances. 132
Domestic enterprises shall only provide security to foreign entities for their
direct subsidiaries or for a proportionate share of the external debt of the enter-
prise in which it has invested as the Chinese Party.
When a domestic non-trading enterprise is to provide security to foreign entities,
the value of its net assets should, in principle, be not less than 15 percent of its
total assets.
When the provision of security to foreign entities is offered by a non-trading
enterprise using domestic investment, the value of its net assets shall, in princi-
ple, be not less than 30 percent of its total assets.
Id.
121. See id. art. 7.
122. See Lo, Security Rules, supra note 83, at 34.
123. See Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, arts. 12, 17; Lo, Security Rules,
supra note 83, at 34.
124. See Foreign Security Procedures, supra note 111, art. 17.
125. See Foreign Security Implementing Rules, supra note 115, art. 3.
126. See Li & Caldwell, supra note 113, at 40.
127. See id. at 42.
128. See Tokley & O'Yang, supra note 115, at 19.
129. See id.
130. See Andrew Goodwin, New Procedures for the Provision of Security to Foreign Enti-
ties by PRC Institutions, CHINA L. & PRAc., Mar. 1998, at 70.
131. See Tokley & O'Yang, supra note 115, at 21.
132. See id. at 19. In the absence of a mortgage registration registry as required in the
Security Law, a mortgagor should register with SAFE. See id. at 20.
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In addition, all amendments to the principal contract require the con-
sent of the Security Provider and SAFE examination and approval. 133
Finally, the Foreign Security Implementing Rules grant SAFE broad admin-
istrative powers to supervise the costs associated with foreign loans,
examine the ability of wholly Chinese owned financial institutions to pro-
vide security, and approve the performance of the Security Provider in its
obligations. 134
Perfection of foreign-related security also requires SAFE's approval to
ensure compliance with Chinese laws. 135 Technically, China's system of
perfection by mandatory registration of security interests is simple.136
However, China's perfection by registration system is complicated since
there is a lack of an accessible and uniform national registration system.
137
Often, the registration process involves an administratively burdensome
multiple approval and registration process that might include practical dif-
ficulties of locating the nterested parties, obtaining their approval, locating
appropriate government departments, and obtaining access to appropriate
government officials. 138
One growing development, however, is SAFE's dominance as the cen-
tral approval agency in laws relevant to an asset securitization transaction.
It is increasingly common to require registration and approvals from both
the local SAFE office and the SAFE central head office. 139 As Chinese laws
133. See id. at 21.
134. See id.
135. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of perfecting
an asset securitization.
136. See Benson, supra note 79, at 198-200. Registration is mandatory for real estate
mortgages, properties, patents, trademarks, and guarantees. See id. at 199; e.g., Beijing
Mortgage Loans, supra note 101, art. 35 ("Mortgage of real estate shall be deemed inva-
lid if it is not registered with the registration department."). The "date of registration" is
the date of perfection and some Chinese lawyers believe that the "date of priority" easily
solves the issue of priority by the rule of first-in-time to register equals first-in-priority.
See Benson, supra note 79, at 198-200.
137. See Benson, supra note 79, at 199. Registration documentation can be very
detailed and administratively burdensome. See, e.g., Secured Loans Regulations, Fujian
Province, supra note 101, art. 30. The following excerpt from Article 30 of the Fujian
Secured Loans, which to the extent not contrary to the Security Law or the Foreign
Security Procedures is still good law, is an example of the detailed registration required
by some local municipalities:
When parties to a secured loan contract handle secured loan registration, the
following documents must be submitted to the registration authority: (1) the
registration application; (2) the secured loan contract; (3) proof of ownership of
or proof of usage rights to the property securing the loan; and (4) certification
of examination and approval by the relevant department or the consent of other
parties regarding the establishment of the security, as required by the
Regulations.
Id.
138. See Benson, supra note 79, at 201. Security interests by foreign enterprises in
China should always seek approval from the appropriate investment authorities as well
as the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. The State Land Bureau should
approve security interests over land. See id. at 202.
139. See Lo, Security Rules, supra note 83, at 36-39 (requiring submission of govern-
ment approval document, audited financial statements of the security provider, audited
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related to asset securitization developed greater uniformity through the
passage of national laws, SAFE emerged as the a recurrent regulatory
agency that shapes the legal developments for future Chinese asset
securitizations. 140
C. Targeted Laws and Regulations
To focus the application of foreign-security interest financing via the Secur-
ity Law and Foreign Security Procedures, China has issued targeted laws to
encourage and facilitate swift development in key areas of particular public
interest. 141 In 1997, SAFE and the State Planning Commission jointly
issued the Highway Law and the Project Finance Procedures. 142
1. Highway Law
The Highway Law is China's first national law dedicated to providing legal
certainty on the planning, construction, maintenance, and administration
of highways. It also signals the central government's eagerness to imple-
ment laws to facilitate financing and development in this field. 143 Prior to
the Highway Law, several highway development projects were approved and
financed without the guidance of national law. These projects included the
Zhuhai Highway in the Zhuhai municipality, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen
Superhighway in the Guangdong Province, and the Shanghai-Hangzhou-
Ningbo Expressway in the Zhejiang Province. 144 All three projects involved
securitizing future revenue streams from toll charges or vehicle registration
charges to finance the construction and maintenance of highways. 145
The Zhuhai Highway transaction indicates how lawyers and financiers
can innovatively complete an asset securitization even without relevant
financial statements of the obligor, a letter of intent to provide security to foreign enti-
ties, a principle contract, and other information requested by SAFE).
140. See China's COSCO Returns, supra note 14, at 1. Due to the ambiguity in Chinese
law, even if SAFE approval is not needed, vigilant lawyers would still consult with SAFE
to ensure that SAFE approval is, in fact, not necessary. In a recent private issuance of
asset-backed securitization by COSCO, lawyers and financiers sought a statement by
SAFE indicating that SAFE approval is not needed. See id. SAFE's recent issuance of the
1998 Administration of Borrowing of International Commercial Loans by Domestic
Organizations Procedures was of sufficient political strength to repeal a prior regulation
by the People's Bank of China, the Conceiving Project Finance Conducted by PRC Enter-
prises Circular. See Lo, International Borrowings, supra note 83, at 66.
141. See e.g., Stephen Harder & Alexandra Daintith, What the Traffic Will Bear: Toll
Roads and the PRC, Highway Law, CHINA L. & PRAc., Dec. 1997, at 43.
142. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonglu Fa [PRC, Highway Law] (Jan. 1,
1998) [hereinafter Highway Law], reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PIRAc., Dec.
1997, at 46; Jingwai Jinxing Xiangmu Rongzi Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Administration of
Project Financing Conducted Outside China Tentative Procedures] (Apr. 16, 1997)
[hereinafter Project Finance Procedures], reprinted and translated in CHINA L. & PRc.,
Jun. 1997, at 55; see also Harder & Daintith, supra note 141, at 43.
143. See Harder & Daintith, supra note 141, at 43; see also Toll Collection and Conces-
sion Rights Under the PRC, Highway Law, CHINA L. & PR c., Jan.-Feb. 1998 (offering
practitioner's advice on applying the Assignment Procedures issued by the Ministry of
Communications in conjunction with the Highway Law in structuring a transaction).
144. See Harder & Daintith, supra note 141, at 43.
145. See id.
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Chinese laws. 146 In August 1996, the Zhuhai Highway Company, acting as
both originator and issuer, successfully completed a $200 million bond
offering. 147 The bond placement secured fees derived from toll roads,
bridges, and tunnels collected by the Zhuhai municipal government,
annual fees for registered vehicles, and entry tolls to the city of Zhuhai.148
In China, infrastructure receivables are the assets of choice to spearhead
the introduction of asset-backed securitization deals because these infra-
structure projects tend to generate a predictable and continuous income
stream from future infrastructure use charges. 149
Many factors made the Zhuhai Highway deal unique. First, the City of
Zhuhai completed the construction of the Zhuhai Highway before the issu-
ance of the asset-backed receivables. Thus, the securitization merely liqui-
fied the present value of the Zhuhai Highway's receivables for use in other
Zhuhai infrastructure projects. 150 Additionally, both local and national
governmental agencies issued the requisite regulatory approvals. 15'
Utilizing the Security Law, all stock in the Zhuhai Highway Company
were pledged to secure the Zhuhai Highway asset-backed securities interest
bearing notes. 152 China's lack of a legal infrastructure did not pose a crip-
pling obstacle as long as SAFE and other regulatory authorities approved
Zhuhai Highway's self-made contracts stipulating investment terms, prior-
ity rights, and bankruptcy rights.' 53 At the time of the Zhuhai Highway
146. See Hsiao-chiung Li & Stella S. Leung, Zhuhai Highway - A Blueprint for Future
Asian Infrastructure Projects?, CHINA L. & PRAC., Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 50.
147. See id. The issuer/special purpose vehicle, Zhuhai Highway Company, was
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. See id.
148. See id. at 51.
149. Compare Part I.A. with Li & Leung, supra note 146, at 52. The toll-related reve-
nue was stable because it was not subject to the level of actual road usage. Instead, the
steady annual fees from the Zhuhai registered vehicles funded the receivables. In a
sense, the Zhuhai Highway deal securitized the tax revenue arising from automobile
ownership. See Li & Leung, supra note 146, at 52.
150. See Li & Leung, supra note 146, at 50.
151. See id. at 51. SAFE approved the foreign currency conversion of the revenue
receivables. The foreign exchange component is very important to a Chinese asset-
backed securitization deal since the Chinese yuan is not a freely convertible currency
and foreign investors demand to receive their payments from their security interests in
their own currency. For credit enhancement, the parent company of Zhuhai Highway
Company, the Zhu Kuan group, arranged to provide $50 million in currency conversion
credit support to bolster the servicing of debt if there was a currency devaluation of the
Chinese yuan against the U.S. dollar. See id.
152. See id.; see also Asian Securitization, EuRowEEK, Apr. 17, 1998, at 22 ("Precedent
for true sales of assets is scanty in China, but the legal provisions are available for an
irrevocable transfer of the usance [sic] right of assets."); supra note 46 and accompany-
ing text (describing the use of a "true sale" in a U.S. securitization).
153. See Li & Leung, supra note 146, at 51. The parties to the Zhuhai Highway
transaction crafted ad hoc contract agreements to provide priority and bankruptcy pro-
tection. These contractual provisions provided Western-style covenants, warranties, and
representations familiar to U.S. investors. Although China lacked the legal framework to
provide these Western-style rights, the assurance by all relevant regulatory agencies pro-
vided an alternative to reliance on the law. Id. On April 1, 1998, the Bankruptcy
(Amendment) Ordinance 1996 and the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Rules 1998 became
effective. These new laws modernized Hong Kong's bankruptcy laws to emphasize reha-
bilitation over punishment and may serve as a precursor for adoption by mainland
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transaction, China also lacked the legal framework to create a trust to serve
as the issuer or the Security Provider. However, the parties constructed ad
hoc trust accounts, with the blessing of the China Construction Bank, to
serve as issuer or Security Provider.15 4
While the Zhuhai Highway transaction proved successful, the exten-
sive use of ad hoc procedures to substitute as a gap filler for China's lack of
laws highlights the enormous inefficiencies that result from creating pri-
vately contracted new law with each transaction. The Highway Law, while
hardly tested, provides hope that increased legal certainty in the approval
process for the operation and maintenance of highways and toll roads will
ease the procedures for securing financing development of such
projects. 155
2. Project Finance Procedures
The Project Finance Procedures is another targeted law that reflects the
Chinese government's attempt at fast-track infrastructure development.' 5 6
The importance of the Project Finance Procedures was underscored by the
fact that they were issued not only by SAFE, but also jointly by the powerful
State Planning Commission.' 5 7 *
The Project Finance Procedures provide clear guidelines regarding the
approval process for "project financing" transactions.158 The State Plan-
China. See Simon Powell, The New Bankruptcy Ordinance & Rules, CHINA L. & PRAc.,
May 1998, at 59 (describing Hong Kong's new bankruptcy laws).
154. See Li & Leung, supra note 146, at 52. The China Construction Bank in Zhuhai
created an escrow arrangement called a "special purpose trust account" to act as an ad
hoc solution to providing assurance that the receivables were kept in a bankruptcy
remote structure. Id.
155. See Highway Law, supra note 142, part 3. Part Three of the Highway Law explic-
itly encourages foreign investment in highway projects and also recognizes financing
techniques such as loans, equity, bonds, and toll fees. See id. Part Six limits securitiza-
tion of future income streams of toll fees to certain designated types of highways
including:
Roads built by departments in charge of communications of local people's gov-
ernments above the county level with loans, or with funds raised from enter-
prises or individuals;
Roads for which domestic or foreign economic organizations have been assigned
the right pre-project to collect tolls in accordance with the law; and
Roads built with investment from domestic or foreign economic organizations.
Id. art. 59.
InJune 1998, Merrill Lynch closed a Chinese highway securitization under the issuer
name "Traffic Streams," which securitized the tolls from several Chinese highways into
U.S.-dollar denominated bonds and then sold the resulting bonds to American investors.
See Securitization/Asian-2: Despite Challenges, Deals Emerge, CAP. MAlRrs REP.,Jun. 25,
1998, at 13:37:00, available in WL, AllNewsPlus Database.
156. See Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 2.
157. See id. art. 11 (stressing the importance of support from the State Planning Com-
mission, a central government regulatory agency, as opposed to lower level municipal
governments).
158. See Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 1 (defining "project financ-
ing" as "a method of financing whereby foreign exchange funds are raised outside China
in the name of a construction project within China and only the projected revenues of
the project itself and its assets are liable to be used for the repayment of debt to foreign
entities").
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ning Commission, however, noted that, despite the intention of the Project
Finance Procedures to increase legal certainty for foreign investors, the
Chinese government intends to approach each project finance proposal
with caution.' 59 This type of give-and-take approach is characteristic of
the cautious development of Chinese laws. While new implementing laws
are passed to encourage freer investments, regulatory oversight and scru-
tiny provide the vanguard against unforeseen problems accompanying the
increased exercise of freedom to contract.160
The effect of the Project Finance Procedures is to contain the costs of
the project so that there is no disturbance in China's balance of payments
and foreign exchange reserves.161 This fear of cost overruns is expressed
in Article 1 of the Project Finance Procedures, which severely limits the use
of security interests to provide financing.' 62 Similar to the Foreign Secur-
ity Procedures and the Highway Law, the Project Finance Procedures also
require SAFE approval of the project as well as approval by the State Plan-
ning Commission at the central government level.163
159. See John E. Lange & Lester Ross, New Project Finance Measures Further Limit
Lender's Room for Manoeuvre, CHINA L. & PRAc., June 1997, at 51. The State Planning
Commission promulgated the Project Finance Procedures in accordance with the
requirements of the State Council's Concerning Further Tightening of Macro-control
Over the Borrowing of International Commercial Loans Circular ("International Com-
mercial Loans"), set forth on September 27, 1995. The International Commercial Loans
stated that investors must pursue overseas financing of domestic projects "gradually
because it presents complex risk-sharing and security issues and is relatively costly and
involves large amounts of funding." Id.; see also Guanyu Jinyibu JiaqiangJieyong Guoji
Shangye Daikuan Hongguan Kongzhi De Tonggao [Concerning Further Tightening of
Macro-control Over the Borrowing of International Commercial Loans Circular] (Sept.
27, 1995) [hereinafter International Commercial Loans].
160. See Lange & Ross, supra note 159, at 51.
161. See id. A project finance undertaking is particularly sensitive to Chinese policy
because it is usually highly capital intensive and costs hundreds of millions - even
billions - of dollars while the revenue generated upon completion is mostly in local
non-convertible currency. See id.
162. See Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 1. Article 1 of the Project
Finance Procedures provides:
(1) creditors have no recourse against assets or revenue other than those of the
construction project;
(2) no institutions in China effect any mortgage, pledge or debt payment with
assets, rights, interests or revenue other than those of or in the construction
project; and
(3) no institutions in China provide financing guarantees in any form.
Id. Non-recourse financing does not have guarantees from the project sponsors. Future
income streams generated from the project produce all payments for the initial construc-
tion and future operation and maintenance. See Lange & Ross, supra note 159, at 54.
The investors may not use the guaranty-security interest type for project finance. See
Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 1(3).
163. See Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 11; Lange & Ross, supra
note 159, at 52. To pass approval, a very detailed feasibility study must also be com-
pleted that details the qualification of the Project's principal investors, the method to
balance foreign exchange payments, pricing formulas, project plan, letter of intent from
foreign financial institutions, support documents by domestic institutions, drafts of
main contract, and "other necessary documents." Project Finance Procedures, supra
note 142, arts. 8-9.
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III. Asset Securitization in China?
"China has challenged the assumption that there is but one route to eco-
nomic production for transitional economies."1 64
The most difficult aspect of asset securitization under China's current
legal framework is securing all the necessary regulatory approvals to guar-
antee the transaction. 165 One commentator, echoing this frustration, has
called for the adoption of "neutral rules. ' 16 6 The adoption of "neutral
rules" entails normalizing and clarifying existing laws to encourage free-
dom of contract without requiring multiple approval requirements from
disparate regulatory authorities. 16 7 In addition to "neutral rules," a "single
unified program [rather] than . . . a patchwork of special regimes" is a
proposed solution to standardizing the Chinese legal system's current diffi-
culties in supporting an asset securitization. 168
Commentators in favor of the adoption of neutral rules and a single
unified program have offered the securitization structures of the United
States and Japan as possible models for China to follow. The United States
and Japan have shown that an asset securitization legal structure is viable
under either the common law or the civil law. In both the U.S. and Japa-
nese models, elements of neutral rules and a single unified program exist
to make asset securitization an efficient and attractive financing method.
Although wholesale adoption of neutral rules and a single unified pro-
gram seems like a straightforward solution to the problems of Chinese
asset securitization, such a view ignores the specific legal and economic
climate of China. Techniques developed in the U.S. and Japan's mature
legal systems and free market economies may prove inappropriate in the
Chinese context.
A. U.S. Model: Neutral Rules and Flexibility
The United States distilled its current legal model for asset securitization
after over seventy years of experimentation, experience, and develop-
164. Lan Cao, The Cat that Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatiza-
tion Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT' L. 97, 178 (1995).
165. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 356-57 ("The task of obtaining all neces-
sary governmental approvals is usually the greatest challenge in concluding any transac-
tion in China.... The situation with respect to approvals is rendered particularly chaotic
by struggles for power among governmental authorities, particularly the struggle
between central and local authorities . . ").
166. George K. Miller, Making Sense of Infrastructure Development, CHINA L. & PRAc.,
Aug. 1998, at 78.
167. See id.
Private parties are not, as elsewhere [such as the U.S.], free to structure arrange-
ments in accordance with neutral rules of general application. Instead, a sepa-
rate rule is promulgated, if not for every occasion, at least for each different
transaction structure receiving official sanction .... Far better to promulgate
neutral rules of general application than to believe one can ever anticipate every
possible specific transaction structure.
Id.
168. Id. For example, under the current patchwork of Chinese laws, at least four legal
regimes apply to the raising of foreign project debt financing. See id.
Vol. 32
1998 Prospects for Asset Securitization in China
ment.169 Over this period, the United States shaped its asset securitization
market and its attendant legal structures in response to the changing eco-
nomic needs of a developing world power that vacillated in its need for this
financing technique.170 The U.S. asset securitization model today inte-
grates the application of different regimes of neutral rule law including
contracts, security interests, trusts, bankruptcy, and tax to provide flexibil-
ity and creativity under a single unified program.' 7 ' The key to the U.S.
model is a strong and independent judiciary that has provided reliable gui-
dance on the application of neutral rules.
Currently, China would have great difficulty adopting the U.S. model.
First, the several regimes of law relied upon by the U.S. model to support
asset securitization are not available in China. While China is continually
modernizing its legal system, important legal doctrines such as insolvency
laws and private ownership are not yet fully developed.172 Perhaps due to
its ponderous size and increased complexity, China cannot embrace asset-
backed securitization financing as quickly as other smaller Asian coun-
tries. For example, Indonesia and Thailand, two countries that have
aggressively implemented asset securitization legislation in 1996, quickly
tapped international capital funds with the asset securitization
technique.173
169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See supra Part I.B and note 43 and accompanying text.
172. See Alsen, supra note 78, at 60; Steven L. Toronto, Bankruptcy of Foreign Enter-
prises in the PRC: An Interpretation of the "Rules Concerning Bankruptcy of Foreign
Related Companies in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone," 4 J. CHINESE L. 277, 277
(1990).
In the metropolitan areas of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Canton), the
enforcement of property rights will work better than in the interior regions.
Even in these cities, the function of property law will not be comparable to West-
ern standards in the foreseeable future. Protection of property rights will slowly
be strengthened, but the PRC still has a long way to go ....
Alsen, supra note 78, at 60. But see Florence M. Li, First National Mortgage Rules Fill
Legal Gaps in Real Property Framework, CHINA L. & PRAc., Oct. 1997, at 25 (reporting
that the Ministry of Construction promulgated the Mortgage Procedures in an effort to
consolidate and standardize local mortgage laws); Powell, supra note 153, at 59 (report-
ing the recent issuance of new laws to modernize the bankruptcy laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region).
173. See STANIDAmR & PooR's, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing the fast growth of securi-
tization in Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore). Both Indone-
sia and Thailand witnessed an immediate and significant growth in capital raising
potential after adopting legislation in 1986 to implement asset securitization. See id. at
3. Indonesia first introduced its Mortgage on Land and Land-Related Objects law to
facilitate lending secured by land in 1996. See ORUCK HERINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP,
supra note 29, at 7. In the 12 months from July 1, 1996 through June 30, 1997 alone,
Standard & Poor's provided credit ratings to three viable Indonesian asset securitization
transactions: Ongko International Finance Co. B.V., which securitized lease property
valued at $100 million; Rembrandt International Co. Holding Inc., which securitized
auto loan receivables valued at $60 million, and Automobile Securitised Finance No. 1
Ltd., which securitized auto loan receivables valued at $200 million. See STmnA &
PooR's, supra note 9, at 2.
Thailand also introduced new legislation on insolvency and issuer entity laws to fill
gaps in the Thai legal framework for asset-backed securitization transactions in 1996.
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Second, the Chinese judiciary, while making important progress in
recent years, still suffers from a shortage of capable judges experienced in
commercial law. 174 Thus, the Chinese judiciary cannot provide the neces-
sary interpretive guidance to competently guide the development of asset
securitization laws. Instead, China relies on the expertise of administrative
state agencies to steer the current path of Chinese asset securitization.
However, Chinese courts have recently shown hopeful signs of increased
competency by developing specialized court divisions, such as intellectual
property courts, that may prove better equipped to decide cases. 175
Third, China is still an authoritarian government controlled by the
Communist Party. 176 Thus, the adoption of liberal "neutral rules" to pro-
mote a general right of freedom to contract is highly unlikely to survive in
China's political landscape.' 77 Even if China adopted free and open "neu-
tral rules" for contracting, the possibility of international market forces
wreaking havoc on China's developing economy poses a real danger. Real-
izing the lessons from the former Soviet Union's catastrophic decision to
quickly embrace the openness of market capitalism practically over-
night,178 China has instead chosen a more cautious and controlled policy
of "privatization with Chinese characteristics.' 79
See id. at 3. In the 12 months from July 1, 1996, through June 30, 1997, Standard &
Poor's provided credit ratings to three Thai asset securitization transactions: Rembrandt
International Co. Holding Inc., which securitized auto purchases valued at $120 million,
SITCARS Funding Ltd., which securitized auto receivables valued at $83 million, and
Thai Cars which securitized auto receivables valued at $250 million. See id. at 2.
174. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 351.
175. See id. ("The [Chinese] courts contain specialized divisions for different types of
cases, usually including civil, economic, administrative and foreign-related business
divisions.").
176. See id. ("The Communist Party of China has been the governing political party of
China since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The Commu-
nist Party plays a leading role (recognized in the Constitution) at all levels of govern-
ment, although its specific legislative, executive and judicial functions are rarely spelled
out....").
177. See Alsen, supra note 78, at 17-19.
The law in China may be considered as first and foremost an instrument of state
power .... Twenty centuries of Imperial justice have not been conducive for the
Chinese to accustom themselves to thinking in terms of rights .... The state
embodies the will of the proletariat, and the courts are subordinate to the high-
est organs of state power.
Id. at 17-18.
178. See Steve Liesman & Andrew Higgens, The Crunch Points: How Russia Staggered
From There to Here, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1998, at A12 ("[In blaming the gap between
theory and practice, the] idea of the invisible hand doing the job in two or three
years ... was not workable.").
179. See Cao, supra note 164, at 174 ("The Chinese model of privatization was
designed to avoid the institutional vacuum associated with shock therapy reform.").
"Privatization with Chinese characteristics" is a term used to describe China's unique
path of retaining its Communist-era state sector while nurturing a growing non-state
sector to harness the benefits of free market economic growth. Id. Recently, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund was criticized for prescribing shock therapy treatment to Indone-
sia without fully appreciating the devastating social and political ramifications for such
economic actions. See Sanger, supra note 5, at A10 ('Jakarta came to symbolize the
I.M.F.'s twin troubles: Its inability to understand and reckon with the national politics
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B. Japanese Model: Instructive Guidance for China
Japan's MITI Law is a good model to guide China in developing a solid
Chinese legal foundation for asset-backed securitization. 180 The MITI Law
integrates the U.S. model of the asset-backed securitization technique with
the regulatory oversight of MITI and the legal rigidity of a civil law sys-
tem.1 8 1 China's development of laws related to asset securitization already
bears a resemblance to Japan's early experience with the MITI Law, and
China would profit in learning from the Japanese experience. 18 2
Japan's MITI Law securitization structure has strong parallels with
China's security laws. Japan, like China, follows a civil code system and
thus permits strong government control over the development of asset
securitization.1' 3 More importantly, the success of both civil code systems
rely upon a competent regulatory agency. In Japan, MITI is the central
agency; in China, SAFE has increasingly developed its role as the dominant
agency while recognizing the continued participation of other agencies.
184
As the issuing and approval agency of many important national laws and
regulations affecting Chinese asset securitization in the past three years,
SAFE has the expertise and political influence to competently oversee
China's future development of an asset securitization market. The impor-
tance of SAFE's function in China is similar to MITI's function in Japan:
both serve as regulatory controls to harness the activity of asset securitiza-
of countries in need of reform, and its focus on economic stabilization rather than the
social costs of its actions.").
180. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 175; supra Part I.C.
181. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 176-78 (describing the steps involved with
a MITI Law securitization structure). The MITI Law securitization structure is similar to
the U.S. securitization structure with the additional mechanism of the Basic Claim cross
receivable that is exchanged for the Specified Claim via the Specified Claim Provider.
See supra Part I.C. This extra level of transaction permits MITI to impose regulatory
oversight over all MITI Law transactions. The registration requirement of the Specified
Claim with MITI and MOF also adds an extra layer of regulatory control over the transac-
tions performed under the MITI Law. See supra Part I.C.
182. See, e.g., Henry A. Fernandez, Globalization of Mortgage Backed Securities, 1987
CoLuM. Bus. L. Ray. 357,360-62 (1987) (detailing the historical development of the U.S.
mortgage-backed securities market and its adoption and internationalization into
Europe and Japan). Japan first participated in asset-backed securitization transactions
by trading in U.S. mortgage-backed securities. The U.S. collateralized mortgage obliga-
tion has a significant market in Japan. See id. at 361. In October 1994, Nippon
Shinpan, a Japanese consumer finance company, issued an asset-backed securitization
backed with domestic auto loans. See Nippon Shinpan Breaks Through with Japan's First
Asset-Backed Securitization, AssEr SALEs REP., Oct. 31, 1994, at 1. In December 1994,
Japan Leasing, which leases industrial and computer equipment, issued asset-backed
securitization notes backed by Japanese equipment lease receivables in the United
States. See Laura Lorber, First Japanese Asset-Backed Deal to Debut in U.S. This Week,
BoNo WK., Dec. 19, 1994, at 1.
183. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 182-83 (The MITI Law requires MITI
licensing of either the Specified Claim Purchaser or the Individual Claims Dealer; the
eligible assigner and the eligible assignee must jointly file a plan of assignment to MITI,
and a special category of receivables can be used, the Specified Claim.).
184. The history of Japan's MITI Law also underwent a period of political turf wars by
governmental agencies, especially between MITI and MOF. See id. at 174 n.9.
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tion while monitoring potential threats to the macroeconomic stability of
the national economy.
As with the Security Law's limitation on five types of recognized secur-
ity interests and the Foreign Security Provision's three types of recognized
security interests, the MITI Law limits its security interest in asset securi-
tization to Specified Claims. 185 Furthermore, both China and Japan have
designated issuers, the Security Provider and the Specified Claims Pro-
vider. Similar to the Japanese MITI Law, the Chinese security laws can
address issues related to insolvency and priority conflicts by mandating
registration under its civil code system, which effectively addresses both
perfection and priority concerns.18 6
Following the MITI Law example, SAFE should streamline the asset
securitization process by designating only one type of security interest and
only one entity as issuer in an asset securitization. By creating a Chinese
legal counterpart to the Japanese Specified Claim Provider, China can
monitor all asset securitizations via a specialized regulatory agency such as
SAFE while providing legal clarity to foreign investors who seek to funnel
new capital into China's growing economy.
A major obstacle to adopting the Japanese MITI Law model is the
existence of jurisdictional conflicts between SAFE, the State Planning Com-
mission, and other national and provincial governmental agencies. The
current situation of conflicting jurisdictional control may be best
expressed by Article 11 of the Project Finance Procedures, which delegates
to SAFE the responsibility over local expertise approvals and delegates to
the State Planning Commission the responsibility over political approvals
from the central government. 187 Ideally, China should follow the MITI
Law example and designate one governmental agency with the most rele-
vant expertise to control asset securitization in China.l8 8 However, until
political and regulatory rivalries are settled, China must tailor its own
model to serve Chinese interests.
185. See id. at 180 n.26 (defining Specified Claims). Specified Claims include lease
receivables, credit card receivables of a fixed installment type, installment loans
extended for the purpose of financing purchase of merchandise, credit card receivables
of a revolving payment type, and other receivables created by Cabinet Order. See id.
Specified Claims also include auto loans, equipment leases, shopping loans, and credit
card receivables. See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 9, at 8.
186. See, e.g., Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 180-84 (explaining the Japanese MITI
Law's perfection procedures). Japan has a mature bankruptcy law that tracks the U.S.
substantive equity powers to review and recharacterize transactions in determining true
sale and priority. For example, similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, the Japanese
courts may take several factors into consideration regarding a true sale, such as the
intent of parties, perfection, pricing, repurchases, and off-balance sheet treatment. See
id.
187. See Project Finance Procedures, supra note 142, art. 11; supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
188. See Shimada & Itoh, supra note 41, at 182.
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C. Chinese Model: A Brave New World
At both the national and the provincial levels, China welcomes asset securi-
tization financing. The Vice-President of the State Development Bank of
China advocates using asset securitization to fund China's massive infra-
structure construction projects.' 8 9 Chinese provinces have also eagerly
voiced their interest in independently forging ahead to securitize provincial
residential mortgages, despite the absence of national laws relating to resi-
dential mortgages.1 90
While China is eager to welcome asset securitization financing, for-
eign investors are both leery of entering a legal and regulatory environment
fraught with uncertainties and tantalized by the potentially vast opportuni-
ties in the Chinese asset securitization market.' 9 1
In the past five years, China has responded to its internal financing
needs and the concerns of foreign investors by actively passing new laws
and regulations to test the feasibility of asset securitization in China.19 2
1. SAFE: Consolidation of Regulatory Control
China's laws and regulations are currently in a significantly better position
to support asset securitization than they were just three years ago. Impor-
tant national laws and regulations, such as the 1995 Security Law,193 the
1996 Foreign Security Procedures, 194 the 1997 Highway Law,195 the 1997
Project Finance Procedures, 196 and the 1998 Foreign Security Implement-
ing Rules 197 have provided a framework to structure a Chinese asset-
backed securitization. In the past three years, Chinese laws and regula-
tions addressed issues such as security interest creation, perfection by
registration, priority rights by registration, designation of which entities
may act as the Security Provider or issuer, and the adaptation of ad hoc
189. See China: Bank Sees ABS as New Finance Tool, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 3, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 7594394.
190. See Adam Reinebach, China Regions May Develop MBS Market, INV. DALum'
DIG., Apr. 20, 1998, at 13; supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting past attempts
to compensate for the inadequacy of national laws by adopting local mortgage laws).
191. See Reinebach, supra note 190, at 13 ("China has the longest way to go in legal
reform but ultimately offers the greatest securitization opportunity [in Asia], due to its
scale and diversity in asset type.") (brackets in original).
192. See infra Part III.C.2; Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 348-49 (describing the
Chinese method of experimentation by trial and error).
Reform in China is not proceeding in accordance with a detailed master plan.
There is a great deal of experimentation involved. In any given field there are
frequent cycles of laissezfaire - creating a sort of policy laboratory in which the
government can study the effects of unbridled activity - followed by a tightening
of regulation. Likewise, experimentation is frequently tolerated (or encouraged)
at a local or regional level, followed by a tightening of regulation at the central
level. There are frequent sharp turns and reversals as the government
encounters the unexpected effects of new policies.
Id.
193. See supra Part II.B.1.
194. See supra Part II.B.2.
195. See supra Part II.C.1.
196. See supra Part II.C.2.
197. See supra Part II.B.2.
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trust laws by State banks to serve as special purpose vehicles. 198
More importantly, the Chinese bureaucracy has increasingly consoli-
dated its regulatory controls over issues relevant to asset securitization
under one governmental agency, SAFE. This development offers the great-
est potential to foster a legal foundation similar to the Japanese MITI Law
model, which relies on MITI for regulatory control. SAFE has consistently
acted as the regulatory agency spearheading and engineering the develop-
ment of asset securitization laws. 199 The prevalence of SAFE as either the
issuing or authorizing agency for all major laws and regulations related to
asset-backed securitization evinces a consolidation of authoritative regula-
tory expertise in SAFE and heralds the dawn of China's national standardi-
zation of asset securitization laws.200
OnJanuary 1, 1998, SAFE issued the International Commercial Loans
Procedures that clarified a broad spectrum of issues related to asset securi-
tization. 20 1 Among other issues, the International Commercial Loans Pro-
cedures addressed the issuance of international commercial loans, the
eligibility of domestic borrowers, the definition of short, medium, and long
term loans, issues related to project finance, operations of overseas borrow-
ings, and operations of offshore banking businesses. 20 2 Moreover, under
the watchful guidance of SAFE, the International Commercial Loans Proce-
dures consolidated past laws and regulations by repealing (1) the 1991
Procedures by the same name, (2) the 1995 Conceiving Project Finance
Conducted by PRC Enterprises Circular, (3) the 1996 Raising of Finance
Overseas by Overseas Branches of PRC Domestic Banks Which Conduct
Foreign Exchange Business Provisions, and (4) the 1997 Further Strength-
ening and Monitoring of the Raising of Finance by Overseas Branches of
PRC Domestic Enterprises.203
Also on January 1, 1998, the Foreign Debts Implementing Rules 20 4
198. See supra Part II.B-C.
199. See discussion supra note 140 and accompanying text.
200. See Chengshi Fangdichan Diya Guanli Banfa [Administration of Urban Real
Property Mortgage Procedures] (June 1, 1997) [hereinafter Mortgage Procedures],
reprinted and translated in, CHINA L. & PRAc., Oct. 1997, at 28; see also Li, supra note
172, at 25 (discussing the national impact of the Mortgage Procedures and overlaps with
the Security Law under the control of SAFE). Formerly, local regulations, such as those
from Guangdong Province and Beijing, would control the use of mortgages. Now, the
Ministry of Construction's promulgation of the Mortgage Procedures has consolidated
and standardized local municipal mortgage laws. However, even the mortgage, which is
directly controlled by the Ministry of Construction, is still within the sphere of influence
of SAFE since a mortgage is one of the five enumerated security interests under the
Security Law. See id.
201. JingneiJiyouJieyong Guoji Shangye Daikuan Guanli Banfa [1998 Administration
of Borrowing of International Commercial Loans by Domestic Organizations Proce-
dures] (Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinafter International Commercial Loans Procedures] reprinted
and translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 67; see Lo, International Borrow-
ings, supra note 83, at 63.
202. See Lo, International Borrowings, supra note 83, at 63-65.
203. See id. at 66.
204. Guojia Waihui Guanliju Waizai TongjiJiance Shishi Xize [Statistical Monitoring
of Foreign Debts Implementing Rules] (Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinafter Foreign Debts Imple-
menting Rules]; see Financing: State Administration of Foreign Exchange Statistical Moni-
Vol. 32
1998 Prospects for Asset Securitization in China
reinforced SAFE's role in national foreign exchange controls. The Foreign
Debts Implementing Rules reaffirm the general requirement that the State
must register all foreign debt.20 5 Moreover, Article 3 defines SAFE's role in
greater detail: not only does SAFE monitor and supervise foreign debt sta-
tistics, but SAFE is now also responsible for debt registration, approving
loan accounts, verifying and approving debt repayments, collecting and
disseminating debt information, and managing the use of foreign debt
funds.20 6 Since the foreign security interest of an asset securitization
requires the issuance of foreign debt, the Foreign Debts Implementing
Rules dramatically strengthen and expand SAFE's role and control over the
future course of Chinese asset securitization. With such examples of con-
solidation in regulatory control, many hope that foreign investors can look
to SAFE to gauge the direction of China's future development of asset
securitization laws.
2. Chinese Two-Tiered Model
At present, China is not ready to directly adopt either the U.S. or Japanese
model and should reject both. Instead, China should develop a two-tiered
model that offers a legitimate alternative to both the flexible U.S. model
and the more structured Japanese model.20 7 A Chinese two-tiered system
would integrate the benefits of both models within the context of China's
political goal of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" to create a model
that best serves China's interests. 20 8
The first tier consists of general laws and regulations that communi-
cate the general principles and policies of asset securitization. The second
tier permits experimentation and application of the general principles via
targeted laws. For example, the 1995 Security Law and the 1998 Security
Law Implementing Rules provide the basic first tier general principles for
Chinese asset securitization.2 ° 9 The 1997 Highway Law and the 1997 Pro-
ject Finance Procedures provide the second tier of targeted laws that grant
the Chinese government a macroeconomic tool to direct development in
certain areas of high national importance.
2 10
The two-tiered approach has strong precedents in China's recent legal
history. China used a two-tiered approach to permit provinces to develop
provincial laws on private ownership of property and mortgages while the
toring of Foreign Debts Implementing Rules, CHINA L. & PRAc., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 8;
Andrew Goodwin, New Rules for Debt Registration, CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 1998, at 52.
205. See Foreign Debts Implementing Rules, supra note 204, art. 6.
206. See id. art. 3.
207. See Cao, supra note 164, at 120 ("[T]he Chinese experience challenges economic
dogma and presents legitimate alternatives for other transitional economies.").
208. See generally id. at 110-11 (discussing the distinct features of "socialism with
Chinese characteristics.").
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See supra Part II.C. The two-tiered concept permits the Chinese Communist
Party to exercise direct control analogous to a command economy, but the Party can do
so with more flexibility because the State is merely encouraging growth in certain areas
instead of actually undertaking the project via a State company.
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national position was still undecided.211 China used the "one country,
two systems" approach to integrate the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region into China pursuant to the Joint Declaration of 1984 between
China and the United Kingdom. 212
The two-tiered system offers the dual benefit of stability and controlled
change, two qualities that are compatible with asset securitization. The
first tier offers a stable core legal structure that appeals to the desire for a
"single unified system." The second tier offers targeted experimentation as
a substitute for the creative exuberance encouraged by "neutral rules."
These second tier laws also permit flexibility in designated targeted areas
while confining the dangers of experimentation to those areas and serving
as a structural bulwark against jeopardizing other sectors of the Chinese
economy.
Unlike other Asian countries that have quickly adopted full imple-
menting legislation for asset securitization, China's two-tiered model takes
the cautious path of testing asset securitization financing only within the
narrow fields of certain types of targeted infrastructure development and
always under the regulatory scrutiny of government agencies such as
SAFE. 213 Perhaps China is merely biding time to protect nascent domestic
markets from the turmoil of increased linkages to the international econ-
omy.2 14 China's lack of integration with the international markets
shielded the Chinese economy from the 1997-1998 Asian regional cur-
rency devaluations. 215 Yet, despite China's protective walls against the
vicissitudes of the international capital markets, investors have success-
fully completed at least three domestic Chinese originated asset securitiza-
tion deals.216 The increased consolidation of regulatory control by a single
211. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
212. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 373.
213. See supra Part II.C.
214. The conditional convertibility of the Chinese yuan is one example of China's
efforts to protect the Chinese market from the vagaries of international market condi-
tions. See Chinese Yuan Unaffected By Currency Turmoils, supra note 4, at *1. Although
China's currency is not freely exchangeable in international capital markets, China
remains active in international economic relations. China adheres to most major multi-
lateral treaties for economic cooperation including the Vienna Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property Rights, various copyright and patent conventions, the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the Hague Convention
on service abroad of civil and commercial documents. China has also developed an
extensive network of bilateral treaties to promote trade and investment including tax
treaties, mutual protection of investment agreements, and judicial assistance agree-
ments. See Cohen & Lange, supra note 78, at 347.
215. See China: Crisis Warns of Foreign Debt Danger, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 23, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13648176; see also China to Clamp Down on Illegal Capital Flow,
CH NA Bus. INFo. NE-rwoRK, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7560022; Chinese Yuan
Unaffected By Currency Turmoils, supra note 4, at *1 (describing the concern that SAFE
officials have in limiting the exposure of Chinese foreign exchange reserves to safeguard
against currency devaluation pressures).
216. See China's COSCO Returns, supra note 14. These three deals are (1) the $200
million Zhuhai Highway transaction, (2) the $288 million Greater Beijing First Express-
way transaction, and (3) the April 1997 COSCO transaction. See id.
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governmental agency such as SAFE and the future development of the Chi-
nese two-tiered model promise a stable Chinese asset-backed securitization
legal structure in the near future.
Conclusion
In the past three years, China has made substantial changes to its laws and
regulations. Within the context of these laws and regulations, asset securi-
tization transactions are achievable. While China has already originated a
few asset-backed securitization transactions, they were all made on a case-
by-case basis with extensive involvement by Chinese governmental
agencies.
The Chinese two-tiered model offers the hope of a more systematic
and efficient system for asset-backed securitization that still permits flexi-
bility and creativity. With SAFE's recent consolidation of control over the
issuance of laws and regulations related to asset-backed securitization,
SAFE offers the expertise and authority to effectuate the uniformity and
standardization of future Chinese asset securitization laws.
Currently, the Asian economic environment is not favorable for SAFE
to aggressively open Chinese markets to the complex financing technique
of asset securitization. However, SAFE should instructively study the devel-
opment of Japan's MITI Law securitization structure as a guide to
strengthen the basic Chinese asset securitization legal structure to serve
the future interests of China.

